In conversation : Donald Davidson - Martin discussion: Epistemology/perception (1997)

Summary

Key Points

• Donald Davidson rejects the traditional justified true belief analysis of knowledge, arguing that a general account of justification is a mistaken project due to varying standards for different beliefs. 0:41
• Davidson clarifies his "coherence theory" of knowledge, stating it merely means beliefs are justified by other beliefs, and explicitly distances it from idealistic interpretations that cut off thinking from the external world. 1:05
• He fundamentally refuses to countenance any epistemic intermediary, such as "qualitative character" or "qualia," between the world and our beliefs, viewing such concepts as leading to skepticism. 2:16
• Responding to John McDowell's "brain in a vat" criticism, Davidson argues that if a brain in a vat could communicate and form thoughts, it would be in touch with its own (limited) world, or it wouldn't be thinking at all without contact with other minds in a common space. 21:20
• He dismisses foundationalism, asserting that only propositions or beliefs can logically justify other beliefs, thus rejecting the notion of a non-propositional "raw sensory given." 24:43
• Davidson explains cases of illusion and hallucination as involving ordinary beliefs about how things look or appear, or about having an illusion, rather than requiring a distinct, non-belief-like "appearance state" as an intermediary. 47:02
• He critiques the concept of "non-conceptual content" as an intermediary, finding it problematic for introducing an unknown propositional attitude and reintroducing skepticism by placing something between the mind and the world. 59:48
• Davidson's positive account of perceptual belief and justification posits that the content of our simplest perceptual beliefs and sentences is established through ostensive learning in actual causal situations, directly linking them to the external world from the start in an externalist manner. 65:11